

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 212609

61

ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:ALATHERTON,JR./NEA/ARN:DRANSOM:HLK

APPROVED BY NEA - JOSEPH J. SISCO

S/S-0 - MR. WRIGHT

----- 098015

P R 272050Z OCT 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

USINT CAIRO

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY ROME

S E C R E T STATE 212609

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 - GDS

TAGS: PBOR, XF

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING FOR JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR

1. SUMMARY: JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SALAH CALLED AT DEPART-
MENT OCTOBER 23 TO EXPRESS UNHAPPINESS THAT JORDAN BEING
KEPT IN DARK ABOUT U.S.-SOVIET TALKS WHILE SOVIETS WERE
KEEPING EGYPT AND SYRIA IN PICTURE AND USG DOING SAME
WITH ISRAEL. HE FEARED JORDAN BEING TAKEN FOR GRANTED.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON BRIEFED SALAH ALONG
LINES STATE 209022, AND STRESSED THAT USG HAS JORDANIAN
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 212609

INTERESTS VERY MUCH IN MIND AND HAS NO DESIRE TO KEEP
JORDAN IN DARK. SALAH SAID THAT U.S.-SOVIET SPONSORED
OCTOBER 22 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION APPEARED TO
COMPOUND AMBIGUITIES OF RESOLUTION 242. UNLESS U.S.
AND SOVIETS TOOK POSITION ON SUBSTANCE OF SETTLEMENT,

WHAT GUARANTEE WAS THERE THAT NEGOTIATIONS TO BREAK DEADLOCK WOULD BE ANY MORE LIKELY TO SUCCEED NOW THAN BEFORE OCTOBER 6? ATHERTON SAID U.S.-SOVIET TALKS IN MOSCOW HAD FOCUSED ON CEASEFIRE AND PROCEDURES FOR GETTING NEGOTIATIONS STARTED SO THAT PARTIES, UNDER APPROPRIATE AUSPICES, COULD BEGIN TO DEAL WITH SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. AS FOR CHANCES FOR GETTING SETTLEMENT PROCESS MOVING, ATHERTON SAID IT IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE NEW SITUATION HAD BEEN CREATED BY LATEST WAR,

BOTH IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON PARTIES, IN CHANGES IN MILITARY SITUATION, AND IN FACT THAT USG AND USSR WERE ENGAGED IN JOINT EFFORTS TO STOP FIGHTING AND GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. FOR ALL THESE REASONS, WE FELT SITUATION TODAY VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT EXISTING BEFORE OCTOBER 6 AND THERE WAS BETTER OPPORTUNITY NOW FOR REAL PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLEMENT TO BE MADE. END SUMMARY.

2. AMBASSADOR SALAH OF JORDAN CALLED AT OWN REQUEST ON DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON ON AFTERNOON OCTOBER 23 TO SEEK BACKGROUND OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 OF OCTOBER 22, 1973.

3. SALAH OPENED BY NOTING THAT SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN CONSULTED BY SOVIETS, AND ISRAELIS WERE VISITED ON OCTOBER 22 BY SECRETARY KISSINGER. JORDAN, HOWEVER, REMAINED LARGELY "IN THE DARK" ABOUT DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW WHICH LED TO OCTOBER 22 RESOLUTION IN SECURITY COUNCIL. SALAH SAID HE HAD HOPED AT MINIMUM THAT SOMEONE FROM SECRETARY'S PARTY COULD HAVE VISITED AMMAN AFTER TEL AVIV STOP SINCE JORDAN WAS NOT ONLY PARTY TO THE CONFLICT BUT ALSO HEART OF THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINE AND LINKED TO
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 212609

SETTLEMENT IN JERUSALEM AND ON FINAL BORDERS.

4. ATHERTON REPLIED HE APPRECIATED JORDANIAN CONCERN AND WANTED TO GIVE AMBASSADOR SALAH AS FULL A BRIEFING AS POSSIBLE ON BACKGROUND OF RESOLUTION. TIMETABLE OF SECRETARY'S TRIP SIMPLY ALLOWED NO TIME FOR VISIT TO AMMAN. ATHERTON SAID HE WANTED TO CALL ATTENTION OF SALAH NOT ONLY TO TEXT OF RESOLUTION BUT ALSO TO ACCOMPANYING STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI. ATHERTON SAID SCALI STATEMENT, WHICH SALAH DID NOT HAVE, WAS CAREFULLY DRAFTED AND MERITED PRECISE READING.

5. ATHERTON SAID THAT SINCE FIGHTING BROKE OUT U.S. HAD PURSUED TWO OBJECTIVES: (A) STOP THE FIGHTING, AND (B) LAY BASIS FOR FUTURE PEACE EFFORTS IN MIDDLE EAST. RESOLUTION 338 IS EFFORT ACCOMPLISH BOTH

PURPOSES. IT CONTAINS PARAGRAPHS CALLING FOR END OF FIGHTING, IMPLEMENTATION OF 242, AND PROCEDURE TO CARRY OUT IMPLEMENTATION OF 242. ATHERTON SAID EVERYONE AWARE THAT IT NO REPEAT NO USE JUST TO TRY TO STOP THE FIGHTING; IT IS NECESSARY TO END CONDITIONS WHICH LED TO THE FIGHTING. IN ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC

ALTERNATIVE, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THERE WOULD BE MORE WARS IN THE FUTURE.

6. IT ALSO CLEAR, ATHERTON CONTINUED, THAT MIDDLE EAST WAS AREA IN WHICH BOTH US AND USSR HAVE IMPORTANT INTERESTS. MANNER IN WHICH US AND USSR DEALT WITH PRESENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS WAS THEREFORE TEST OF NEW US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND OF ERA OF DETENTE. FACT THAT WE AND SOVIETS AGREED ON FORWARD-LOOKING AND CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION IS VICTORY FOR POLICY OF DETENTE.

7. ATHERTON SAID THAT IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WAS TO STABILIZE CEASEFIRE WHICH HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY EGYPT, ISRAEL AND JORDAN. SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING LATER IN DAY OCTOBER 23 WOULD DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM, IN-SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 212609

CLUDING QUESTION OF HOW TO USE UNTSO TO SUPERVISE CEASEFIRE. ATHERTON NOTED THAT RESOLUTION WAS NOT SPECIFIC ABOUT MECHANICS OF CEASEFIRE. THESE MUST BE WORKED OUT BY THE PARTIES, USING UNTSO FACILITIES IF DESIRED. RELATED ISSUE WAS POW EXCHANGE. WE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED WHILE IN ISRAEL WITH IMPORTANCE ISRAEL ATTACHES TO EARLY RELEASE OF POWS BY BOTH SIDES. ALTHOUGH THIS NOT IN TEXT OF NEW RESOLUTION, SOVIETS AND USG HAD BOTH AGREED TO URGE EARLY POW RELEASE LEST PRISONER ISSUE BECOME SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS ON OTHER MATTERS.

8. TURNING TO SECOND AND THIRD PARAGRAPHS, AS "POLITICAL PARTS" OF RESOLUTION 338, ATHERTON SAID THEY CLOSELY LINKED. THESE PARAGRAPHS MEAN THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RESOLUTION 242 WOULD PROCEED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES CONCERNED "UNDER APPROPRIATE AUSPICES." ATHERTON NOTED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME SC HAD ENDORSED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS PRACTICAL MEANS OF PROCEEDING TO SOLUTION OF PALESTINE AND ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM.

9. "APPROPRIATE AUSPICES," SAID ATHERTON, REMAIN TO BE WORKED OUT IN SPECIFIC TERMS. US AND SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO MAKE AVAILABLE JOINT GOOD OFFICES TO PARTIES CONCERNED, IF THEY SO DESIRED.

10. SALAH SAID THAT HE FEARED AMBIGUITY OF SC RESOLUTION 242 HAD BEEN COMPOUNDED BY AMBIGUITY OF RESOLUTION 338. HE NOTED THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE NO CLOSE TIE BETWEEN THE CEASEFIRE AND THE PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT. THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN WOULD NEED SOMETHING MORE SPECIFIC

ON US/SOVIET DISCUSSIONS OR AGREEMENT ON HOW RESOLUTION 242 WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED. HOW ELSE, HE ASKED, COULD JORDAN ENTER NEGOTIATIONS AS IT WOULD HAVE TO AS A PARTY TO THE CONFLICT? SALAH SAID THAT ON ITS FACE RESOLUTION 338 APPEARED TO MEAN THAT SC HAD ENDORSED IDEA OF NEGOTIATIONS WHILE OMITTING ANY REFERENCE TO UN OR SECRETARY GENERAL. SALAH SAID THAT
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 212609

NEGOTIATIONS AND AVOIDANCE OF UN INVOLVEMENT HAD LONG REPRESENTED TWO AIMS OF ISRAELI DIPLOMACY, AND THEY HAD NOW BEEN ADOPTED IN A TIME OF MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF ISRAEL.

11. ATHERTON REPLIED THAT USG HAD LONG SEEN NEGOTIATIONS AS ONLY MEANS OF RESOLVING DIFFERENCES OF INTERPRETATIONS OF RESOLUTION 242. NOW, HOWEVER, NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE AGAINST A NEW BACKGROUND. HE URGED SALAH TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FACT THAT FIGHTING, WHICH VERY COSTLY TO BOTH SIDES, HAD CREATED PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND VERY DIFFERENT THAN THAT PRIOR TO WAR. ATHERTON NOTED THIS PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE APPLIED TO BOTH SIDES. SECOND, SAID ATHERTON, US AND USSR WERE NOW JOINTLY ENGAGED IN EFFORT TO GET PROCESS GOING. THIS IS THE SECOND NEW ELEMENT IN THE SITUATION WHICH GIVES CAUSE FOR HOPE. FINALLY, SAID ATHERTON, FOCUS OF TALKS IN MOSCOW WAS NOT ON SUBSTANTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF RESOLUTION 242 BUT ON A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE A FRAMEWORK FOR ENDING HOSTILITIES AND GETTING TALKS GOING. SALAH COULD NOT EXPECT US AND USSR TO RESOLVE ALL LONG-STANDING DIFFERENCES ON INTERPRETATION OF 242.

12. SALAH ASKED WHAT WOULD MOVE THE ISRAELIS IF THEY DECIDED AFTER THIS LATEST WAR THAT THEIR BEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO BECOME MORE OBSTINATE? WITH NEW LOSSES, SAID SALAH, ISRAELIS MAY DECIDE TERRITORY IS BETTER GUARANTEE OF SECURITY THAN SETTLEMENT. ATHERTON SAID THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT IT WAS TOO SOON TO JUDGE WHAT FINAL IMPACT OF WAR WOULD BE ON ATTITUDES IN ISRAEL. HE NOTED THAT WAR NOT ONLY HAD BEEN VERY COSTLY BUT CEASEFIRE HAD LEFT FOUR EGYPTIAN DIVISIONS ON EAST BANK OF SUEZ CANAL AS WELL AS ISRAELI ADVANCES IN SYRIA AND WEST OF CANAL. SITUATION TODAY WAS DIFFERENT PSYCHOLOGICALLY, STRATEGICALLY AND IN ITS MAJOR POWER ASPECTS FROM WHAT IT HAD BEEN BEFORE

OCTOBER 6.

13. SALAH ASKED WHO WAS GOING TO INITIATE TALKS?

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 212609

ATHERTON SAID THIS REMAINED TO BE WORKED OUT, BUT NOTED THAT RESOLUTION 338 MADE PROVISION FOR "APPROPRIATE AUSPICES." PROCESS OF DIPLOMACY, INCLUDING BETWEEN US AND USSR, WOULD CONTINUE. WE ARE DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM.

14. SALAH ASKED IF IN USG OPINION INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR INITIATION OF DISCUSSIONS. ATHERTON REITERATED THAT QUESTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTED "APPROPRIATE AUSPICES" REMAINED TO BE WORKED OUT.

15. SALAH SAID THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN HOPED THAT THE US INTERPRETATION OF 242, AS SET FORTH IN 1969, STILL STANDS. ATHERTON SAID HE COULD NOT GIVE AN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION. THE ORIGIN OF USG VIEWS ON FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS AS SET FORTH IN 1969 WAS IN US/SOVIET AND FOUR POWER TALKS AT THAT TIME, BUT THEY HAD NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY ANYONE. WHAT HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE, ATHERTON SAID, WAS THAT OUR FOCUS IS NOT REPEAT NOT ON PUTTING FORTH U.S. PLANS FOR A SETTLEMENT BUT ON GETTING NEGOTIATING PROCESS STARTED SO THAT PARTIES COULD PUT OWN VIEWS ON TABLE, WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. SC RESOLUTION 338 PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY TO DO THIS. SALAH SAID HE FEARED THAT PARAGRAPH 3 OF RESOLUTION 338 WEAKENED PARAGRAPH 2. LATTER CALLED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242, BUT FORMER CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS. ATHERTON REPLIED THAT SECOND AND THIRD PARAGRAPHS ARE CLOSELY LINKED AND COMPLEMENTARY. FORMER CALLS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242; LATTER CALLS FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE THAT END. THIS WAS ENVISAGED IN RESOLUTION 242, WHICH RECOGNIZES NEED FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARTIES -- AGREEMENT THAT IS ONLY POSSIBLE THROUGH PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

16. SALAH RETURNED TO IDEA THAT CONTACTS WITH EVERYONE BUT JORDAN MADE HIM VERY UNEASY. HE SAID HE HAD PERSONAL FEAR THAT BIG POWERS WERE CONDUCTING BUSINESS WHILE TAKING JORDAN FOR GRANTED. ATHERTON STRONGLY DENIED THIS, SAYING THAT THE USG HAD THE
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 212609

INTERESTS OF JORDAN VERY MUCH IN MIND. AS FOR JORDAN'S BEING LEFT OUT, ATHERTON SAID, HE HAD CONVEYED TO

AMBASSADOR SALAH A FULL APPRECIATION OF MOSCOW TALKS,
AS WE HAD DONE FOR ISRAEL DURING SECRETARY'S STOPOVER
IN TEL AVIV.

17. SALAH COMPLAINED HE STILL FELT "IN THE DARK" AND

TURNUED TO ALLEGED QUOTATION OF PRIME MINISTER MEIR
IN KNESSET WHERE SHE REPORTEDLY SAID SHE HAD BEEN
ASSURED BY SECRETARY THAT NO PRESSURES WHATSOEVER WOULD
BE APPLIED DURING NEGOTIATING PROCESS, WHICH WOULD BE
FREE OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. ATHERTON SAID SALAH
SHOULD LOOK TO STATEMENTS OF U.S., NOT ISRAELI SPOKES-
MEN AS REPRESENTING POSITION AND VIEWS OF USG. KISSINGER

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 11 MAY 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: WAR, BRIEFINGS, PEACE PLANS, MEETINGS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 27 OCT 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973STATE212609
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: NEA:ALATHERTON,JR./NEA/ARN:DRANSOM:HLK
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 - GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: P750020-1062
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731066/abqcejid.tel
Line Count: 286
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 JUL 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <27-Jul-2001 by thigpegh>; APPROVED <21-Sep-2001 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING FOR JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR
TAGS: PBOR, JO, XF, US, EG, SY, UR, UN, (MEIR, GOLDA), (ATHERTON), (SALAH)
To: AMMAN INFO BEIRUT
CAIRO
JIDDA
KUWAIT
MOSCOW
LONDON
PARIS

BONN
TEL AVIV
USUN N Y
JERUSALEM
ROME

Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005